1. INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Industrial Revolution and the advent of hyper-connected society have accelerated the U.S.-China space race. The emerging technologies such as AI, IoT, big data, are surpassing physical national in speed and scope. Products based on emerging technologies can be delivered simultaneously and in a variety of customized ways along distributed supply chains. Competition in emerging technologies is akin to the technological hegemony waged by the United States and Britain in the first half of the 20th century in the electrical engineerings, consumer products, and automotive industries. The competition for technological hegemony also happended between the United States and Japan in the second half of the 20th century,[1] in the home appliance industry and the computer hardware and software industry.

After the ICT revolution, a person who has mobile devise can use the services provided by the technology without physical and time constraints. The international market with the ICT revolution would be characterized as a winner-take-all. The international market has been also leaded to platform competition in which companies or states that have built a technology platform have an absolute advantage over companies or states that have not.

Meanwhile, because technological advances are key drivers of economic growth and social change, states that gain technological leadership have the power to shape the new international order, giving rise to technological hegemony. Technological advances create new issues in a variety of ways. It creates risk and uncertainty, which can lead to conflicts between states. It prematurely impacts diplomacy, trade, and investment. However, the competition for emerging technologies has been resulted to a platform competition, where winners and losers are more stark and short-lived, and even established hegemonic states or leading companies can quickly lose their competitive edge.

Competition and utilization of emerging technologies is expanding into outer space. The war in Ukraine is a stark reminder of this. The war in Ukraine has reaffirmed the strategic value of outer space. Despite Russian bombing and cyberattacks, Ukraine is fighting the war with communications through space. Meanwhile, the movements of Russian troops invading Ukraine were shared with the world via low-orbit satellites from Maxar Technology, a private commercial satellite company. This has allowed the Ukrainian military to understand the Russian military’s movements and then effectively counterattack to repel the Russians. The Ukrainian military has targeted Russian command and supply lines, and has used individualized anti-tank weapons and drones have dealt serious blows to Russian forces. In addition, as Russian troop movements and damage were revealed through satellite imagery, the Russian fake news and disinformation campaign based on Propaganda was neutralized and the misery of war was shared. As a result, global citizens who share liberal democratic values were outraged by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The strategic value of outer space, identified through the war in Ukraine, is to ensure security against threats from the ground to space, threats from space to the ground, and threats from space to the ground. The need to develop new space security technologies is increasing, as space poses new threats to space assets from competitors and adversaries, the risk of space debris falling to Earth, hazards from space phenomena, and the risk of cyberattacks on space assets and public services.

With the successful launch of Nuri, we have joined one of the middle space powers. This is the result of the efforts to develop new space technologies and promote related industries, funded by Korean government. However, under the accelerating expansion of outer space, it is necessary to develop new space security technologies to ensure safe operation and freedom of navigation in space. The development of new space security technologies is necessary to strengthen strategic autonomy in the space with a viewpoint from a security perspective, not just as from the development and industrial promotion.

Enhancing military capabilities based on the development of new space security technologies and securing a competitive edge in space security has become a major challenge for Korean government. To this end, we will examine the current status and implications of the U.S.-China competition and the competition for new technologies in the new space era. We will also review the current status and implications of the development of new space technologies and space-enabled technologies. Based on this, we will propose the establishment and implementation of the Korean space security strategy. In particular, by examining the governance structure, public-private cooperation, legal system, and technological development related to space technologies, we will propose policies for the development of the space industry, enhancing the safety of people’s lives through space, and securing security dominance in space, a strategic space.

2. SPACE TECHNOLOGY COMPETITUTION AND SPACE SECURITY IN THE NEW SPACE ERA

2.1. U.S.-China Space Competition under the New Space Era

2.1.1. US-China military space race is in full swing

As the space race becomes more intense in the new space era, states are competitively securing space power and establishing space forces. These are expected to go beyond the militarization of space and advance the era of space weaponization in earnest. Needless to say, the United States, the world’s first space power, and China have building space power by focusing on space launch vehicles and proprietary satellite navigation systems in order to seize hegemony in outer space.

The United States has dominated the space race with space powers such as China and Russia, but it is facing stiff challenges from China. In 2017, the U.S. Congress revived the National Space Council to create a space force, criticizing the U.S. for not securing a sufficient level of space competitiveness compared to its rivals. In addition, in March 2018, President Trump proposed a unified approach based on the Four Principles[3] to prioritize U.S. interests in space, sustain U.S. superiority in space, and maintain peace through strength. As a result, in 2019, he released the Space Policy Directive 4 and established the Space Force in December. The total strength of the Space Force is about 16,000, and about 2,000 personnel from 23 units of the Air Force were converted to the Space Force. In November 2022, the Space Forces Command was established under the Indo-Pacific Command to prepare for the growing nuclear and missile threats from Russia, China, and North Korea. In December, a space force unit was also established in the U.S. Forces Korea to collect and share real-time North Korean nuclear missile intelligence in conjunction with the U.S. Pacific Space Command.

In June 2020, the ministry released its National Defense and Space Strategy for the next decade, which outlines the following goals, First, secure space stability by providing space-level support for joint and coalition operations while maintaining space superiority. Second, it analyzes the threats from space and opportunities surrounding space in a strategic context. It identifies China and Russia as the most urgent and serious threats with the ability and willingness to threaten U.S. national interests, and North Korea and Iran as growing threats. In conclusion, Strategic Approach, calls for maintaining space superiority by improving space capabilities over the next decade in close collaboration with allies, commercial space industries, and others stakeholders to serve U.S. vital interests. The strategy reflects a shift in the Department of Defense’s approach to space as a major combat domain rather than a traditional support domain. The strategy emphasizes four major lines of effort: achieving comprehensive military dominance in zero space; integrating space into joint coalition operations; creating a strategic environment in the space domain; and collaborating with allies and government agencies [2].

The United States continues to develop new technologies and expand its space capabilities to ensure and maintain its leadership in space. In 2019, it created the Space Force and Integrated Space Command to conduct missions in space warning, satellite operations, and space control and support. The National Space Defense System, which consists of five layers and hundreds of satellites, is being built under the Department of Defense (The five layers are ①the transmission layer (inter-satellite optical communications, command and control), ②the detection layer (hypersonic weapons, ballistic missile detection), ③the management layer (non-line-ofꠓsight surveillance). ④navigation layer (GPS enhancement), and ⑤support layer (launch sites and space operations support). And Early Warning Satellite, Ground-based surveillance systems are being developed.

China, on the other hand, recognizes space as a strategic area of competition and is actively pursuing state and military-led space exploration. It has the relevant capabilities to become a space power with intensive state support. In the “National Science, Technology and Innovation Plan of the 13th Five-Year Plan” in 2016, China announced plans to strengthen six space capabilities, including the Shenzhou satellite, the Shenzhou space navigation system, the Shenzhou space shuttle and the Shenzhou rocket launcher. In recent years, it has focused on achieving tangible results with the aim of becoming a space power, especially in realizing a launch capability similar to that of the United States, which ranks second in the world in space rocket launches.

China is strengthening its space capabilities by building its own satellite navigation system, Beidou, and promoting the establishment of a space station, and is accelerating the development of space-based weapon systems such as anti-satellite missiles (ASAT) and high-powered lasers in preparation for the militarization of space. In particular, China has launched a total of 59 satellites of the Beidou series since 2000 and completed its own satellite navigation system in 2020, and currently operates 35 of the 55 satellites of the Beidou series on a full-time basis. The Beidou system has increased the precision of weapons. It is expected to improve the ability of land, naval and air forces to conduct long-range joint operations by receiving accurate location information in real time.

China deploys space surveillance assets across the country to observe space conditions in real time. Most of its communication satellites are operated for both civilian and military purposes, with a small number of military satellites. As of 2020, China has a total of 44 communication satellites, of which three are military satellites. As of 2019, China operated 159 surveillance and reconnaissance satellites, including 56 for military surveillance and reconnaissance and 103 for civilian observation. In addition to securing such space power, China is promoting the militarization of the space domain through the creation of a strategic support unit in charge of space, cyber, and electronic warfare in 2015.

2.1.2. Increasing competition for space technology for industrial and exploration purposes

The United States has encouraged private industry to invest in space exploration and development to boost the U.S. economy in the Space Policy Directive released by the White House in December 2020, and in 2018, NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Service (CLIPS) called for the development of private technologies for lunar landing and lunar transportation systems. In other words, U.S. recognized the need for active participation of private companies in industrial and scientific exploration and established policy guidelines to encourage it.

As a result of the government’s active encouragement, the U.S. is utilizing Space-X’s Starlink to provide satellite internet services around the world. In 2020, the world’s first civilian manned space exploration was launched. In particular, Space-X is leading the way in manned space development by successfully reusing the first stage rocket of the Philo 9 more than 100 times. In addition, innovative space technologies are being developed by startup companies such as Axiom Space (space stations), Planet (satellite imagery), and Rocket Lab (small rockets). In addition, government-led Artemis docks with the International Space Station for the first time, and plans for a manned mission to Mars are moving forward.

Following the first human exploration of the lunar rear surface by the Chang’e 4 lunar probe in January 2019, China successfully returned samples to Earth after landing on the moon, and is also pursuing plans for a manned mission to Mars based on the construction of a manned lunar base by the 2030s. In addition, the world’s third space station, the Tenggong, is scheduled to be completed in 2024, and in 2022, China and Russia will launch the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). They agreed to jointly promote space development technology experiments such as spacecraft lunar landing and cargo transportation by 2030, and joint construction of essential research facilities such as telecommunications and power facilities on the lunar surface by 2035. In 2023, the country plans to launch about 70 space rockets in total, mainly observation satellites (Yaogan). It is launching to replace aging satellites such as the spy satellite (Gaoping), the low-orbit constellation satellite (Guowang), and the Beidou navigation satellite. It is also striving to establish itself as a leader in space exploration with the installation of Shunten, a new deep space observation telescope on the Tenggong space station that is superior to the U.S. Hubble telescope (The Süthen telescope is estimated to have a 300 times wider field of view than the Hubble Space Telescope).

2.2. Space Security in the New Space Era

2.2.1. Rapid changes in the space security and technology landscape

Major countries are intensifying the era of space competition for space dominance in the New Space Age. They are expanding space development at the national strategic level to improve the quality of life of the people and acquire future resources, and are striving to secure space supremacy by acquiring core space technologies and enhancing technological competitiveness. On the industrial side, the economic ripple effect is dramatically increasing, including the creation of new industries through space technology, and industrial productivity through space internet services. The private sector-led New Space Era is accelerating to revitalize the entire industry by improving efficiency.

Space has evolved from a mythical space of legends and signs, through the operational space of Cold War regime competition, to the ordinary life area that supports digital economic activity. With its numerous Earth Observation and communication satellites and GPS, as well as the Space Internet, space serves as a conduit for the eyes and ears that facilitate the movement of people and capital and spread the exchange of information. Therefore, as space has become a space of life and industry, it has become increasingly difficult to develop new space technologies on a national basis. The new space era has opened up, requiring the development of new space technologies through private or commercial initiative or private cooperation.

Meanwhile, as space evolves into a new space of value and profit, major powers are competing for new technologies to win the space race. This is because winning the space technology race will allow them to extend their hegemony into outer space based on military superiority and economic competitiveness. The U.S.-China rivalry and the development of new technologies, the acceleration of COVID-19 and the digital society, and the hybrid war in Ukraine have accelerated the factionalization in outer space. Authoritarian states are interfering with space internet access, jamming GPS, testing satellite interceptor missiles, and creating space debris hazards. Recently, North Korea has increased the space threat on the Korean Peninsula by launching military reconnaissance satellites in rapid succession.

More specifically, the dramatic changes in the security and technological environment surrounding outer space compared to the past decade can be characterized by the following four dimensions. First, the diversification of space actors. In the past, space activities have been centered on governments and national actors, but in the new space era, the role of commercial actors such as corporations is becoming more prominent. In particular, the case of Space-X’s Starlink shows that corporations are becoming important actors in space security.

Second, Disruptive space-related technologies. In addition to space security activities, space-based services are being expanded through a wide range of civilian programs such as communication, navigation service, weather forecasting, and scientific and technological experiments, and innovative disruption is occurring in relation to technology. In particular, the pace of development is changing rapidly as it is combined with national core technologies such as artificial intelligence, 5/6G communication, and big data.

Third, the current international order in space is in a state of disorder. The current norms for space security are based on the legacy of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPOUS) under the UN. There is a Disarmament Commission (DC), but it is not enough to control the indiscriminate development of space. Moreover, when it comes to establishing norms such as space debris, the interests of each state are so sharp that joint norms have not been established. Furthermore, most of the existing space-related norms are outdated and out of step with the rapidly changing New Space Era, where space power has not been emphasized.

Fourth, space technology is dangerous. As seen in the military space race between the United States and China, space technology for military purposes is becoming increasingly lethal. Rocket launchers alone are being utilized as the base technology for hypersonic missiles, and the surveillance capabilities of reconnaissance satellites are also deadly to other countries. Other space technologies include electromagnetic waves, lasers, and cyber attacks, making outer space even more dangerous. Moreover, although countries are supposed to abide by the principle of peaceful use of outer space, they are taking a contradictory attitude by expanding their space weapon systems for their own space dominance. They are also expanding their organizations to enhance their military space capabilities, which can multiply the risks.

2.2.2. Increasing military and non-military threats to space assets

① Increased military threats to space assets

The future battlefield will see a significant expansion of space and cyber beyond the land, sea, and air domains, and these domains are expected to become increasingly important, especially in the pre-war and early stages of war. These aspects can be easily seen in the Ukraine war. Russia possessed a large number of satellites for military communications, reconnaissance, and navigation, but had many limitations on their actual military use, such as reaching the end of their lifecycle and limited access to spare parts due to Western sanctions. It also attempted jamming and cyberattacks on satellites early in the war, but was quickly countered by the West. Increased security neutralized the attacks, Ukraine, on the other hand, was using a commercial service satellite, Viaset, which could not be utilized due to Russian cyberattacks early in the war. Western countries, such as the United States, rely on space assets for battlefield situational awareness, communications for command and control, navigation for firepower and maneuvering, etc. to support the Ukrainian military’s operations. In particular, Space-X’s Starlink, a private company, played a key role in the Ukrainian military’s command and control and information sharing during the early stages of the war (see TABLE 1 Russian space threat technology against the Western in the Ukrainian war).

Specifically, threats to key assets are ground and space-based, such as ground-based anti-satellite interceptors. It can be divided into space/space-based electronic jamming, such as the Suzuban missile defense system, and space/terrestrial areas, such as cyber attacks [3].

The distinction between military space threat technologies is as follows [4](see TABLE 2 Categorization of threat technologies against space assets). First, there are kinetic energy attack (KEK) technologies that destroy satellites by launching missiles from surface-to-air platforms. A typical example is missile interception of satellites in low Earth orbit by high-performance fighter jets or ground-based missiles. In 2007, China conducted a test in which it destroyed its decommissioned satellite with a satellite interceptor missile, and in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2018, it conducted simple launch tests. Russia conducted simple launch tests in 2018 and 2020, and tested an ASAT missile that destroyed its own satellite in 2021. The United States also destroyed its military satellite ‘USA-193’ with an ASAT missile in 2008. In addition, countries are developing killer satellites, which are categorized into types that capture other countries’ satellites with robotic arms or nets, emit chemicals to disable them, and use radio waves to interfere with communication.

Second, there are non-kinetic energy kill techniques. Directed energy weapons, such as lasers, can be used to damage the sensors of an imaging satellite, causing temporary dazzling or permanent damage (partial blinding) depending on the energy magnitude. Then there are jamming techniques, including jamming and electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Jamming is the application of stronger noise in the same frequency band as the satellite signal to the uplink and downlink between the satellite and the ground control center, causing disturbances. In particular, uplink jamming can be accomplished with very little energy by placing a small satellite, called a jammer, near the satellite. Electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) can destroy unprotected satellites, and radiation can damage and disrupt communications with satellites in low Earth orbit. In addition, space cyber hacking, which aims to steal, modify or destroy data in the process of information communication between space assets and ground control centers, is an emerging threat to space security.

② Increased non-military threats and space risks from man-made and natural objects

Due to the saturation of man-made space objects in Earth orbit, space hazards such as collisions between satellites and falling natural objects are increasing, and serious damage to the national economy and people’s lives are expected.

Space debris and satellite-to-satellite collisions due to increased commercial space activities in the low-Earth orbit region. The potential for safety issues in the event of a large meteorite falling to Earth is significantly increasing. Currently, there are 8,486 satellites in orbit, 2,163 satellites launched in 2022, and an estimated 32,300 pieces of trackable orbital debris.[4] Specifically, as of 2021, there are more than 32,000 objects larger than 10 cm in space, and more than 1 million objects between 10 cm and lcm. It is estimated that there are 330 million objects between 1 lcm and 1 mm.[5] The number of managed non-geostationary satellites passing over the Korean Peninsula is 4,407 in 2021, 6,482 in 2022, and 8,187 in 2023, of which 89% are low-orbit satellites, increasing the possibility of collisions and crashes in space [6]. To prepare for the risk of crashing space objects, on January 9, 2023, the Korean Ministry of Science and ICT announced a satellite crash disaster safety text to all citizens due to the possible crash of the U.S. observation satellite ‘ERBS’ near the Korean Peninsula.

Next is the Dellinger phenomena, which is caused by the solar wind and can cause satellite communications to degrade, leading to malfunctions in navigation satellites, etc. In addition, activities such as sunspots can cause damage to terrestrial communications equipment, satellite and launch services, malfunctions of precision-guided weapons systems, etc. can cause orbital deviation and failure of satellites. To prevent this, related technologies shall be developed: establishing a space weather warning system to observe images of solar activity using solar telescopes, measuring solar radio waves with solar telescopes, and observing the state of the Earth’s ionosphere with ionospheric radar [3].

2.3. Space Security and Space New Technology Development

2.3.1. Distinguish between space security technologies and new space technologies

Space security can be understood as the sum of technical, institutional, and political means to ensure the use of space, access to space, and the use of space for security on Earth without any interference or interruption, encompassing safety and defense [7]. In particular, space security is often associated with intentional and military space threats from other countries. On the other hand, space safety can be seen as a response to unintentional and secondary space risks such as space debris. Of course, in recent years, there has been a trend to include space safety within the concept of space security.

Therefore, space security technologies can be viewed as technologies that limit the space activities of an adversary while countering the adversary’s space threats. Reconnaissance satellites, launching vehicles and navigation satellites are included in space security technologies. On the other hand, space new technology is a concept that expands the scope of security technology including technologies for space industry or scientific exploration, Artemis missions or spacecraft masters, Mars exploration, space debris disposal technologies. Of course, the boundary between space security technology and space new technology may be unclear due to spin-offs and spin-ons, but the latter can be understood as a concept that encompasses the former. TABLE 3 shows the core space technologies in the space industry and space security.

2.3.2. New technologies applicable to military space assets

① New spaceborne technologies for military purposes

Currently, the core of the space program includes satellites, situational awareness (SSA), and launching vehicles, but new areas such as electronic warfare and cyber capabilities are emerging in combination with these space technologies.

Therefore, in addition to the existing core space security technologies, it is necessary to expand to technologies that integrate the three domains: space power can be operated on its own, but since it is largely dependent on electromagnetic waves, functional linkages between the two domains are essential, and cyber is also a combination of space and electronic warfare.

Space, cyber, and electronic warfare are expected to accelerate. On the practical side, it is urgently need to prepare for space cyber hacking, GPS jamming, and EMP, especially from North Korea and China, and how to protect against Sino-Russian satellite jamming and interception by future anti-satellite weapons (ASATs)(see TABLE 4 Advanced New Space Technology Areas).

② New technology applicable to national safety, space industry, and scientific exploration

In addition to traditional space technologies for national security purposes, there is a growing trend of space technology development related to public safety, to protect citizens from solar wind, climate change, and disasters. Remote sensing, Earth observation, global communication, navigation, and various space technologies are contributing to national security, space industry, and disaster prevention and response. In particular, they are essential for safety in the new space era, such as tracking other countries’ military threats and monitoring space debris and solar products.

The development of multipurpose space technologies such as small launch vehicles and micro-satellites that can be developed in a short time and at low cost is expected to increase. Artificial intelligence, Big Data, 5/6G communication, and other core national technologies are being applied to revolutionize the space industry and serve as a mechanism to promote Lunar and Mars exploration and deep space exploration.

3. CHARACTERISTICS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR NEW SPACE SECURITY TECHNOLOGY POLICY

3.1. Characteristics of Major States’ Space Security and New Technology Policies

3.1.1. United States

The United States is primarily focused on diplomacy and deterrence, but if that fails, it is prepared to win a war at any time. It seeks “integrated deterrence,” combining current U.S. strengths to maximize effectiveness. While the traditional approach to space has been focused on a support function, however it has been gradually shifted to a warfighting donmain. Because so many functions of national security depend on space systems, it is imperative that to improve its resilience. As space is both an information domain and a military operational domain, ensuring capabilities to stay ahead in the space is also important. This is accomplished by leveraging commercial technological advances and the acquisition process. Therefore U.S. with allies and liked minded states, has been increasingly engaging in cooperative research, development, and acquisition (RD&A) with private companies.

The U.S. capabilities are primarily reversible in nature. However, it does appear to be prepared to transition to destructive capabilities at a moment’s notice. Specifically, it has the Counter Communication System (CCS), a space system to combat electronic warfare. It is conducting considerable research and development on ground-based high-energy lasers and has low-power laser systems. It is also known to have plans to conduct feasibility studies on directed energy weapons for ballistic missile defense. U.S. has world-class space situational awareness capabilities and has recently focused on laser communications technology, called space optical communications, in preparation for the explosion of data and deep space exploration in the commercial technology sector, as well as artificial intelligence technology for autonomous spacecraft, which is expected to be useful in deep space exploration. It has decided to develop a direct-ascent ASAT capability, but has been vocal about banning experiments to do so.

As a leading nation in the New Space Age, U.S. recognize the importance of regulating commercial space to foster economic growth and establish U.S. leadership in commercial space development. A strong, innovative, and competitive commercial space sector is the source of sustained U.S. leadership around the world.

U.S. proposed the Space Priorities Framework to creat a regulatory environment encouraging competition and allowing the private sector to rapidly develop technologies under free-for-all competition. It also attempts to establish a transparent regulatory process that minimizes the regulatory burden on companies. However, there is a need to strike a balance to ensure that deregulation does not lead to a situation where China violates its international obligations or jeopardizes national security.

In recent years, the U.S. has been in conflict with China and Russia in the area of international cooperation or norms in the space sector. Unlike the U.S., which is in favor of maintaining existing international law while adding interpretations and behavioral guidelines. China and Russia argue that the existing international law or normative system has many limitations in governing outer space. The U.S. has been leading the discussion to de-escalate the arms race in space, including leading the adoption of a resolution at the UN to ban ASAT testing, based on strengthened relations with allies and like-minded states. In cooperation with United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand France, and Germany, U.S. have also joined the Coalition Space Operations Vision, which calls for greater cooperation to prevent conflict in space.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA) is pursuing the Artemis program with about 32 countries under the Outer Space Treaty, which provides for international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space. It has also signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs to renew a long-standing partnership. It is utilizing existing allies such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and South Korea in its cooperation, and is trying to deepen qualitative cooperation across multiple fields such as cyber, space, and electromagnetic waves.

3.1.2. Japan

Japan has been a non-military actor in space activities due to the Peace Constitution, but with the enactment of the Basic Law on Space in 2008, the scope of space security activities has been expanded to include defensive space security activities, and it has recently begun to be noticed as one of the major actors in various space security fields. Although Japan has had basic technologies such as satellites since the 1970s, military space activities are still in their infancy, so major organizational, legal, and institutional reorganization and capacity development are needed. Recently, Japan has restricted capabilities on ASAT and SSA with support from the U.S.. Japan has been investing money and equipment to develop jamming capabilities. It has a leading position in the private sector in space debris disposal technology.

Japan want to utilize diverse data from space systems to strengthen comprehensive national power, including diplomatic, defense, and economic power. It emphasizes the need to contribute to the international community in the development of international norms for sustainable space use. In order to secure a strong space defense force, Japan support the innovation of a strong domestic space industry in line with the new space era, and recognize that it must consider cybersecurity, information protection systems, supply chains, and investment soundness in order to actively utilize private sector technologies and services. As Japan deepen its cooperation with allies and like-minded countries, Japan also strive to maintain interoperability and security systems.

Based on ‘Space Basic Law’, ‘Basic Space Plan’, ‘Space Safety and Security Initiative’, a public-private partnership system and governance are being established. To expand the scope of activities by revitalizing the previously stagnant research and development field, Japan is focusing on creating a virtuous cycle of knowledge creation. By participating in the Artemis program, Japan aims to open up new markets and provide opportunities to strengthen private sector R&D and industrial competitiveness, and focus on developing and fostering human resources in the field with a long-term perspective.

International cooperation in the space sector centers on Japan’s cooperation and solidarity with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the European Union. Japan is also expanding cooperation with other countries such as NATO, India, and South Korea. Japan agreed to expand the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty from land, sea, and air to cyber and space. In multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, the U.S. supports U.S.-led discussions on de-escalation of the arms race in outer space, Japan has led several normative proposals for the peaceful and sustainable use of outer space.

3.1.3. China

China has a strong “Space Dream” policy to secure its position as a global leader in space. The idea is to become a global leader in space by 2050 through a complete revolution in space technology and equipment by 2045. This will require a combination of scientific technology and commercial technology. It emphasizes the interconnectedness of science, technology, commercial technology, and military technology. In particular, the military technology sector is investing heavily in the development of tactical space launch (TRSL) technology for rapid multi-domain satellite launches. Although the development of such technologies is led by the state with a focus on national security, it has recently strengthened cooperation with central and local governments and space start-up companies. In terms of space diplomacy, it is striving to expand its influence by promoting the Belt and Road Space Information Corridor, which utilizes space power.

3.1.4. Russia

Russia is focusing on capacity building, including space technology development, as a symbolic aspect of its return to great power status, and on the development and utilization of “customized space and anti-space technologies” that target potential adversary vulnerabilities. It is pursuing a thoroughly “state-led” development of new space security technologies, and is strengthening international cooperation, integrating flexible and pragmatic diplomacy with the proactive setting of space technology-related norms.

3.1.5. Australia

Based on its Space Security Strategy, Australia is making national investments in the development of new space security technologies, with a particular focus on space launch vehicles, space communications, and overseas payload technology. The legal framework has been established through the establishment of the Australian Space Agency and the enactment and implementation of the Launch and Return Act. In terms of space diplomacy, Australia is strengthening cooperation with major countries based on cooperation with the United States, which operates a space base in Australia.

3.2. Factors to Consider for Space Security Emerging Technology Policy Development

3.2.1. Structure and Goverance

A collective governance role is important to drive the development of new space technologies. Examples include the NASA, the European Space Agency (ESA), the China National Space Administration (CNSA), and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). Their main functions include policy, research and development, space industry development, human resource development, and international cooperation.

Supply chains aimed at stimulating the space economy are also an important area of responsibility for space governance and organization. In order to increase South Korean share of the global space industry market, which is currently in the low 1% range, South Koran need to increase the supply of space-related materials. It is essential to build a stable supply chain of parts and equipment, as well as an ecosystem for the space industry to grow properly. Considering that the space industry is in its infancy, effective support from government organizations is needed to build a new industry ecosystem.

The new space environment is not an old area where the government can be in charge of policy, R&D, budget, and business as it was in the past. Therefore, the establishment of the Korea Aerospace Administration is the occasion to establish space policy. The space agency is in charge of international cooperation for core technology development, supply chain, etc. while the space industry should create a virtuous cycle of private sector-led ecosystem.

3.2.2. Public-Private Partnership

SpaceX’s Starlink system and the provision of battlefield intelligence by private satellite companies in the Ukraine war reaffirmed the potential of private companies to make a decisive impact on space security. In other words, the commercialization of space and private participation in space development are dramatically intertwined, forcing governments to explore opportunities for commercial efficiency and technological innovation through public-private partnerships.

In developed countries, the space industry has been privatized in stages since the 1980s and the commercial utilization of space has begun, but South Korea has only just begun to activate private participation and faces a technology gap with overseas companies. Considering structural limitations such as the narrow domestic market, it is necessary to promote public-private partnerships that are unique to Korea. ‘Korean-style public-private partnership in the new space era’ can be summarized as public-private partnership to effectively overcome the relevant constraints facing Korea in the global new space environment and strengthen space exploration, and the following points should be considered [10].

First of all, under the new space environment, the boundaries between space security and commercial areas are not clear, and many trends are expected to intersect with each other. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen efforts to discover and develop related fields through public-private partnerships to prevent duplication of investments and expand synergies, both nationally and in the space industry. Next, although the New Space Era is characterized mainly by commercial purposes, it can be inferred that space capabilities for national security purposes will continue to be required. Considering South Korea’s security situation, it is necessary to draw alliance support and cooperation and use it as a mechanism to reduce the cost of space capabilities.

3.2.3. Develop new technologies for space security through the Space Diplomacy Outreach

Korea is one of the world’s top seven space states, but there is a significant gap in space capabilities compared to other countries in the top six. Therefore, cooperation with the U.S. is crucial to reduce this gap and secure space technology. Establishing a stable global supply chain for materials and components, training specialized human resources, etc is needed to strengthen space capabilities. The U.S. has also capitalized on parallel efforts to reduce the enormous cost of developing space capabilities by increasing cooperation with allies to share the cost. South Korea shall consider to participate to QUAD and AUKUS cooperating in space and cybersecurity, as well as bilateral space cooperation with Japan, and Australia.

4. POLICY RECOMMENDATION

4.1. Establishment of <National Space Security Strategy>

With its initial stage on the capability to respond to threats to space assets, it is necessary for South Korea to establish a national space security strategy including to enact related laws and regulations, establish governance, and foster human resources. When South Korea take on the steps to establish the <National Space Security Strategy>, it is necessary to strengthening linkages with the National Security Strategy, National Cybersecurity Strategy, and National Space Development Promotion Plan, and to design a road map to develop space technologies responding to threats to space assets from authoritarian states.

In Korea, space security was introduced for the first time in the Fourth Space Development Promotion Plan (December 2022) and set as one of the five long-term space development missions [11]. The plan proposes to upgrade surveillance forecasting and space cybersecurity capabilities by 2030 to establish a system and secure technical capabilities for safe life on Earth and space assets. In addition, the core mission elements include disaster response capabilities, space situational awareness and traffic management, space system protection (countering space junk and other space threats), and national security response(such as securing surveillance and communication satellites.[11] However, the lack of a space security strategy limits the response to threats from space. It is also true that there is a lack of linkage between the National Security Strategy, the National Cyber Security Strategy, and the National Defense Space Strategy.

President Yun Suk-yeol released the <National Security Strategy> in June 2023 calling for the acquisition of various space capabilities, including reconnaissance and communication satellites, space launch vehicles, and space surveillance systems, in order to effectively conduct joint space operations and contribute to national space development. The <National Space Security Strategy> sahll be establised in conjunction with <National Space Security Strategy> and the <National Space Defense Strategy>.

When establishing a <National Space Security Strategy>, it is necessary to consider referring to the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defense and presenting the following as key principles: shared awareness of space threats, enhanced resilience and security of space systems and services, development of dual-use space capabilities including security and defense purposes, and strengthened global partnerships.

4.2. Establish Space Security Governance

It is necessary to develop core technologies to respond to space threats and establish a governance system that can strengthen space security based on them. Since space security is a multidisciplinary project that cannot be accomplished by a single ministry, a control tower that can coordinate roles and tasks among ministries. Space security requires the collection, utilization, and sharing of space information, as well as research and development of related new technologies. It is linked to military use and international cooperation. It requires cooperation between the National Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Science, Technology, ICT, and Ministry of National Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It will also require cooperation with the Korea Aerospace Administration, which established in May 27, 2024. Furthermore, the Korea Coast Guard and the Ministry of the Interior and Safety, which are responsible for public safety and responding to disasters, are also expected to carry out some of the space security-related tasks. In order to coordinate and control such multi-ministerial cooperation, it is necessary to establish a space security governance under the coordination by the National Intelligence Service(NIS). NIS has established the National Space Security Center following the ‘Presidential Decree on NIS’ Space Security Mission’. Korea Aerospace Administration shall be consult with NIS when it conduct any action on space security following the ‘Special Act on Establishing and Operating Korea Aerospace Administration’.

4.3. Improving Space Security Legislation

The existing Space Development Promotion Act focuses on the development and operation of space assets and is largely indifferent to space security. The Act stipulates that the Minister of Science and ICT must consult with the heads of relevant central administrative agencies in advance when promoting space development projects related to national security [13]. It also stipulates that the President must establish and implement security measures for such projects by presidential decree [14]. In order to deliberate on matters deemed necessary for the purpose of national security in relation to the National Space Commission, the President is required to establish a committee of the Working Group of Security and Space Development with the Vice Minister of National Defense and one deputy director of the National Intelligence Service as co-chairpersons [15]. In addition, the Act requires that the heads of relevant agencies be consulted on matters related to national security, such as permission for space launches, corrective orders, and accidents. However, the current Space Development Promotion Act establishes norms for space development with a focus on state-led space development, which seems to have limitations on the operation of the normative system for space security.

This is because there are limitations in defining a response to space threats from and toward space, as well as the various threats that occur throughout the lifecycle of space asset development.

In order to respond to space security threats and secure South Korea’s autonomy and competitiveness in outer space, which is evolving into a U.S.-China competition, it is necessary to complement legislation that systematically stipulates matters related to space security. Therefore ‘The Basic Act on Space(tentative)’ shall be enacted, describing a governance structure for space security, launch of space assets, space traffic control, and space situation awareness. The (thetative) Act shall regulate matters related to space security in general, including space cyber, space policy, and the development of new space technologies. In particular, it is necessary to consider regulating the security and military use of commercial satellite imagery and services. In addition, it is necessary to stipulate a certification system for civilian space-related hardware and software to establish a supply chain security system to protect space assets and respond to cyber threats.

In addition, it is necessary to strengthen the space security-related the mission of the National Intelligence Service by dedicating the security. ‘Presidential Decree on NIS’ Space Security Mission’ based on the National Intelligence Service Act[16], has been revised, establishing security measures to deal with space crises. The revision of this Decree has specified the space security tasks performed by the National Intelligence Service. In particular, it has specified the space security tasks as securing space assets, collecting and distributing space information, responding to space crisis situations, and space security. In addition, it has defined the role of the National Intelligence Service in responding to space crises and utilizing satellite assets. It has also introduced a specialized institution designation system for space security-related research and development to promote systematic research management. It has specified the establishment and deployment of security measures for space security purposes and the development and distribution of cryptographic technology. It has described the management of the National Satellite Operation Center. It has also described that the NIS may cooperate with domestic and foreign intelligence agencies and organizations in charge of space affairs, and may form and operate space security-related councils, if necessary to carry out space security tasks. It has described the NIS to develop or invest in educational programs to secure and train professional and technical personnel.

4.4. Strengthening International Cooperation Based on the U.S.-ROK Alliance

Yoon Seok-yeol administration’s National Security Strategy extends U.S.-ROK alliance cooperation to cyber and outer space [17]. Based on the U.S.-ROK alliance, South Korea needs to strengthen cooperation with alliances, partners and like-minded states, led by the United States, to protect space assets from North Korean threats, including GPS jamming, EMP threats, and hacking attacks against U.S. and South Korean ground-based space systems. South Korea shall develop joint surveillance tracking and related technologies for space debris, with U.S.

A good example is the strengthening of the role of the ROK-U.S. Space Integration Team with the creation of the ROK Air Force’s Space Operations Squadron and the U.S. Space Force in 2022. In addition, practical cooperation should be strengthened by participating in various international space exercises such as Global Sentinel, an exercise to master international cooperation procedures for preparing for space risks and threats such as satellite collisions and debris fall. In addition, South Korea shall extend its bilateral space security cooperation with Australia (2021, Agreement on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in Space), and France (2023, MOU on Defense and Space Cooperation) to strengthen cooperation in the space sector.

South Korea should actively participate in UN and international organizations’ efforts to protect space assets. For example, South Korea should participate in norm-establishing processes, such as the UN General Assembly’s Committee on International Security and Disarmament, and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Outer Space (UNCOPUS), to ensure that South Korean positions are reflected. In addition, South Korea needs to develop agendas and build capacity for leadership roles in multilateral space security cooperation initiatives, led by the UN, on issues such as anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and space debris.

However, given the current limitations of our technological capabilities, South Korea needs to prioritize its attention to space cyber security and space debris, and focus on creating conditions for leading future international cooperation on space security.

4.5. Strengthening Space Security Capabilities through Application of National Core Technologies

In order to protect space assets and improve ‘space resilience’, it is necessary to strengthen efforts to apply national core technologies such as Al, next-generation communication technology (5/6G), quantum computing (cryptographic security), and big data(data analysis). Through the application of these technologies, early detection of threats to space assets will be possible. South Korean shall also strengthen space situational awareness and countermeasures against ASAT threats. By developing these technologies South Korea shall overcome the gap with major countries and advance a specific space security technology such as space debris disposal.

4.6. Strengthening Public-Private Partnerships

In the New Space Age, public-private partnerships are essential to applying new technologies to enhance space security capabilities. In the New Space Era, space development, once considered an inherently governmental endeavor, has been privatized. The U.S. Department of Defense has leveraged private capital for space investment “by a ratio of more than 30:1” over the years.[18] For every dollar of DoD funding invested in commercial space systems, $30 in development costs come from outside the government, including venture capital. In 2019, investment in commercial space companies reached $5.7 billion, up from $3.5 billion the previous year, with more than 70% of the funding coming from venture capital [19].

To keep pace with the private sector’s innovative space developments, space security organizations must also adopt and integrate new technologies to gain a human security advantage in space. Accordingly, these agencies should work closely with space startups, ventures, as well as innovative companies in the established space industry, to develop space security technologies. In addition, the National Intelligence Service, the Ministry of National Defense, and others should ensure that the space industry can effectively collaborate with space security programs. The National Space Council’s Secure Space Development Working Group needs to report to the President and Congress on the state of the space security industry.

As the private space industry grows, government policy will also be an important factor in the success of the commercial space industry. Government-management cooperation is critical to the development of space security technologies and industries. To capitalize on the growing private space industry, governments need to provide reasonable levels of initial and ongoing funding for promising companies and new technologies. This will reduce the risk and uncertainty of developing and applying new technologies and encourage venture capital investment. Governments should also explore the development and deployment of new tools to support the space industry base, such as space bonds and Space Commodities Exchanges (SCEs) [20]. For the development of the space industry, SCEs can help secure critical supply chains for products. Governments can use these exchanges to spread demand and increase purchasing power for the space industry. These efforts can give companies confidence that the government is there to support them so they can continue to innovate. Similarly, space security agencies, such as the National Intelligence Service, the Ministry of National Defense, will need to demonstrate their longstanding, articulate, and sustained support for the space industry through policy instruments that can be trusted.

4.7. Workforce development

The most fundamental asset for realizing space security is the development of an expert workforce. Space Security policymakers should focus on developing competencies in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM), with a particular emphasis on specialties related to emerging technologies, such as robotics and quantum-related technologies. To enhance competitiveness in the space security sector in the future, a cross-governmental approach is needed to develop STEM professionals in the state, public, and private sectors. To this end, space security agencies should collaborate with universities to foster and support research and development programs related to space assets, space intelligence, and space security. Such programs are expected to contribute significantly to the development of future professionals based on strengthening basic research capabilities. In this regard, it is necessary to more actively promote the expansion of opportunities for substitute military service and graduate student benefits conditional on working in STEM fields in South Korea.

5. CONCLUSION

South Korea do not have a national space security strategy, and the legal, institutional, and technological frameworks are inadequate. Furthermore, there is much to be done to develop public-private cooperation, which is the most important aspect of the new space era. To this end, this study makes the following recommendations. First, a <National Space Security Strategy> shall be establshed to promote the development of space security and space industry, with the conjunction with the established <National Security Strategy>, <National Cybersecurity Strategy> and <National Defense Space Strategy>. Second, public-private partnerships for space security should be strengthened. Through this, South Korea can create a research and industrial ecosystem for the development of space security technologies, secure the resilience of space systems and services, and develop new technologies. Third, it is necessary to overhaul the relevant legal framework. The ‘Basic Act on Space (tentative)’ should be enacted to regulate the safe utilization and protection of space assets, the development of the space security industry and technology development. And the revised ‘Presidential Decree on NIS’ Space Security Mission’ shall be implemented with legitimacy and sustainability. Finally, international cooperation should be expanded based on the U.S.-ROK alliance to ensure the freedom of free and safe space navigation.